Other Languages(1) A person who has been convicted of a felony under federal law, or under the law of another state, unless restored to his civil rights, should be regarded as disqualified from voting in the state of Washington under Article VI, § 3 of the state Constitution, unless the felony of which the person was convicted has a counterpart which is not a felony under the criminal laws of this state.(2) To the extent that a person who has been convicted of a crime under federal law or under the law of another state is disqualified from voting in the state of Washington, the governor of this state has the authority to restore such person's civil rights so as to enable him to vote in this state.
1. When a person is charged with a sex crime before his or her eighteenth birthday and is later convicted and receives a "special sex offender sentencing alternative", the state Department of Corrections is financially responsible for any treatment associated with the sentencing alternative. 2. When a person is charged with a sex crime before his or her eighteenth birthday and is later convicted and receives a "special sex offender sentencing alternative", the financial obligation of the Department of Corrections to pay for treatment continues after the person reaches the age of eighteen.
The requirement of § 4, chapter 14, Laws of 1975, 1st Ex.Sess. (RCW 9.79.170) that persons convicted of first degree rape ". . . be confined for a minimum of three years . . ." does not restrict the power of a superior court to grant a conditional release to a person earlier given a deferred or suspended sentence in order to be committed as a sexual psychopath under the provisions of RCW 71.06.060 and 71.06.091 following a conviction of first degree rape.
(1) Under the provisions of § 6, chapter 8, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., the Administrator for the Courts is required, in 1983, to compile a report covering crime victims' compensation penalty assessments paid, or due, during calendar year 1982.(2) A crime victims' compensation penalty assessment is to be paid pursuant to RCW 7.68.035(3), as amended by chapter 8, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., upon forfeiture of bail where the offense with which the defendant was charged is either (a) a crime defined by state law which is punishable, thereunder, as a felony or a gross misdemeanor, or (b) a crime defined by a city ordinance which is punishable thereunder as a gross misdemeanor and which, in addition, covers conduct which is the same, or substantially the same, as conduct which is defined to be criminal by state law.(3) A crime victims' compensation penalty assessment is to be imposed under RCW 7.68.035(1), as amended, when an accused individual is found guilty of having committed any crime defined by either a state statute or a county or city ordinance, including ordinary misdemeanors, with the exception of those motor vehicle crimes expressly referred to in subsection (2) of the statute, whether defined by state statute or by a substantially similar municipal ordinance.(4) The penalty assessment provided for by RCW 7.68.035(1), as amended, is applicable in the case of a conviction, on or after March 27, 1982, of a crime committed prior to the date.(5) If a person is found guilty of a number of separate counts contained in the same criminal information, each of which represents a separate and distinct crime, a penalty assessment is to be imposed under RCW 7.68.035(1), as amended, on the basis of each such count.(6) A crime victims' compensation penalty assessment is not to be imposed, under RCW 7.68.035, as amended, on an alleged juvenile offender who has undergone diversion proceedings pursuant to chapter 13.40 RCW.
1. !ih*If a city or town police officer arrests a person for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor violation of state law within the city or town limits and delivers that person to county authorities for prosecution, the county has no authority to charge the city or town for booking, jailing, or prosecution of the person, unless the city or town has agreed by contract to assume some of those costs.2. The Court Improvement Act of 1984 (Laws of 1984, Chapter 258) does not require cities and towns to agree to reimburse counties for costs of booking, jailing, or prosecution where the city or town chooses to charge persons for violations of state law, even where the city or town could have chosen to prosecute for parallel violations of city or town ordinance.3. Where a city or town has repealed a portion of its municipal code, defining a crime or crimes equivalent to offenses listed in RCW 46.63.020, but has not reached agreement with the county for apportionment of costs associated with those offenses, the county may not unilaterally assess costs against the city or town. The county may bring court action to force the city or town to meet its obligations under the Court Improvement Act of 1984 (Laws of 1984, Chapter 258), and may be entitled in appropriate cases to recoup portions of costs incurred since the effective date of the Act.
a
RCW 13.40.265(2)(a) provides that if a juvenile enters into a diversion agreement with a diversion unit concerning certain offenses, the Department of Licensing shall be notified. Once notified RCW 46.20.265 requires the Department to revoke the driver's license of the juvenile. These provisions do not apply when the diversion unit employs the counsel and release procedure authorized by RCW 13.40.080(11) instead of entering into a diversion agreement.
(1) A landlord or other person acting under his authority who enters the premises of his tenant without the tenant's consent or without the authorization granted by RCW 59.18.150 may be subject to prosecution for criminal trespass under RCW 9.83.080. (2) The defense against criminal liability for trespass afforded by RCW 9.83.080(3)(d) is not available to a landlord or one acting under his authority who has unlawfully entered upon the premises of a tenant. (3) A landlord who unlawfully enters upon the premises of his tenant may be deemed to have entered with the intent to commit a crime therein, and thus be found guilty of burglary in a criminal prosecution therefor, unless such unlawful entry can be explained by testimony satisfactory to the jury to have been made without criminal intent.
The sentencing procedure for murder in the first degree set forth in RCW 9A.32.040(2) does not apply so as to permit a person to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon a plea of guilty to first degree murder with an aggravating circumstance.
Counties have the authority to define certain local offenses and to prescribe penalties for their commission including the imposition of specific costs. Subject to certain limitations, a county may include as a cost a multiple booking fee imposed on persons convicted of such county offenses and sentenced to serve time in the county jail on intermittent days. Such a multiple booking fee could offset the cost to the county of processing the individual in and out of jail.2. A county does not have the authority to impose a multiple booking fee on individuals serving time in the county jail on intermittent days who have been convicted of violating a state statute. The Legislature, rather than the county, specifies the punishment for state crimes including costs.