1. RCW 76.09.060(3) provides that a forest practices application shall indicate whether any land covered by the application will be converted or is intended to be converted to a use other than commercial timber production within three years after completion of the forest practices described in it. If the application does not state conversion is intended, for six years after the date of the application, a local government may deny all applications for permits or approvals relating to nonforestry uses of land subject to the application. 2. If a prior landowner did not indicate an intention to convert land to a use other than commercial timber production, RCW 76.09.060 empowers a local government to deny application for permits or approvals relating to nonforestry uses of land subject to the application filed by a subsequent owner of the land for six years after the date of the application by the prior landowner. 3. If a local government does not exercise its authority to deny applications for permits or approvals relating to nonforestry uses of land pursuant to RCW 76.09.060, a new landowner may convert the land to a use incompatible with timber growing, assuming such a change is lawful in other respects. 4. If a local government does not exercise its authority to deny applications for permits or approvals relating to nonforestry uses of land pursuant to RCW 76.09.060, a new forest practices application is necessary if the activity is a forest practice for which a forest practices application is required.
Under Article VIII, § 7 of the Washington constitution it is not legal for a county which charges an admission fee for attendance at a fair conducted under RCW 36.37.010, et seq., to waive that charge for nonindigent persons attending the fair for no other consideration, primarily to be entertained rather than in the performance of some official function; it is, however, not illegal for fair officials, news reporters or others who are attending the fair for the benefit thereof in the performance of their employment functions and not merely to be entertained, to be allowed in without paying the usual admission charge.
(1) Chapter 88, Laws of 1973, Ex. Sess., authorizes the legislative authorities of all classes of counties to increase or decrease the salaries of those county officers whose salaries are fixed by its provisions. (2) Under Article XXX, § 1 (Amendment 54) of the state Constitution, prohibiting mid-term salary increases for elective and appointive officers who fix their own compensation, a board of county commissioners or other legislative authority may not grant a mid-term increase in compensation to its own members under chapter 88, Laws of 1973, Ex. Sess. (3) A board of county commissioners or other legislative authority exercising the powers granted by chapter 88, Laws of 1973, Ex. Sess., is effectively authorized by this chapter to fix the salaries of its other elective officials at or above their current levels by an ordinance adopted prior to January 1, 1974, but it may not reduce any of those salaries below those levels. (4) After January 1, 1974, a board of county commissioners or other county legislative authority which by inaction has simply allowed the new salary levels fixed by the legislature to take effect most likely will not be able then to roll those salaries back to their prior levels in the case of any county elective officials then serving ‑ except on a basis which will cause those salary decreases not to take effect until the commencement of the next ensuing terms of the respective county officers.
Where a person is found mentally ill in proceedings brought under chapter 71.02 RCW and committed to a state hospital, the state and not the county is liable for the cost of detention for any period of time which elapses between the entry of the order of hospitalization and the time an ambulance arrives to transport the patient to a state hospital.
The failure of Pend Oreille to have approved the additional judicial position for Ferry, Pend Oreille and Stevens Counties, jointly, which was conditionally provided for by chapter 65, Laws of 1981, does not mean that Ferry County is to continue to be treated as part of a judicial district with Okanogan County.
A county sheriff, municipal police chief or judge of a court of record may not refuse to issue a concealed weapons permit to an applicant, otherwise qualified, simply because of his or her refusal to be photographed, to produce a valid Washington driver's license, or to indicate his or her federal social security number, or solely on the ground that the applicant lives outside the particular county or municipality involved.
(1) Within the unincorporated areas of a county which are served by a fire protection district, the uniform fire code, as adopted pursuant to chapter 19.27 RCW, requires the fire chief and the department of that district to perform each of the administrative and enforcement functions listed in § 1.201 thereof, together with such other functions as are required, under the heading of "Administration" in Division II of the code, to be performed by the "Fire Chief" or "Fire Department." (2) A county, however, in the exercise of its authority under RCW 19.27.040 to amend the various component parts of the state building code in certain respects, may alter the manner in which the uniform fire code is administered within any or all of its unincorporated areas through the adoption of an amendment to that code designating some other official as the "Fire Chief" for the purpose of administering and enforcing its provisions.
Under RCW 9.46.113 law enforcement activities related to the enforcement of state gambling laws must be regarded as having the "first call" on municipal gambling tax revenues authorized by RCW 9.46.110.
If a city or town police officer arrests a person for committing a felony within the corporate limits of the city or town and turns such person over to the custody of the county sheriff because the arrest was for a violation of a state law and not a city or town ordinance, it is the county, and not the city, which is then responsible for paying the care, housing and board of such prisoner while he is in the county jail‑-both before and after arraignment.
Attorneys who are constitutionally required to be appointed to represent indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases before a district justice court are to be compensated for their services under RCW 10.01.110; however, the costs of such compensation must be drawn from the county current expense fund of the county in which the court is situated and not from justice court revenues under RCW 3.62.050.