Washington State

Office of the Attorney General

Attorney General

Bob Ferguson

AGO 1982 No. 17 -
Attorney General Ken Eikenberry

DISTRICTS ‑- SCHOOLS ‑- EMPLOYEES ‑- SALARIES ‑- LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTION ON SCHOOL EMPLOYEE SALARY INCREASE FOR 1982-1983 

In view of restrictions contained in the 1981-83 appropriations act, as last reflected in chapter 50, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., school districts are not legally permitted to grant salary increases (other than as permitted by RCW 28A.58.095(3)) for the 1982-83 school year prior to June 30, 1983, except in the case of those employees who are covered by contracts entered into prior to April 20, 1982 which entitle the subject employees to salary increases during the 1982-83 school year prior to June 30, 1983. 

                                                              - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                               December 30, 1982

Honorable Dan McDonald
State Representative, 48th District
4650 ‑ 92nd N.E.
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Cite as:  AGO 1982 No. 17                                                                                                                

Dear Sir:

            By letter previously acknowledged you requested our opinion on the following question relating to public school employees' salaries:

             "Are school districts which were not obligated, by virtue of a contract executed prior to the effective date of chapter 50, Laws of 1982, 1st ex. sess., to grant either the classified or certificated employees of the district a salary increase for the 1982-83 school year prohibited by law from now granting any such employee a salary increase for the 1982-83 school year prior to June 30, 1983?"

             Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of RCW 28A.58.095, we answer the foregoing question in the affirmative.

                                                                      ANALYSIS

             We begin by noting the full text of RCW 28A.58.095, generally referred to as the school district "compensation limitation" statute.  That statute, which codifies § 2, chapter 16, Laws of 1981, reads, in full, as follows:

              [[Orig. Op. Page 2]]

            "(1) Every school district board of directors shall fix, alter, allow, and order paid salaries and compensation for all district employees.  No school district board of directors may grant salary and compensation increases from any fund source whatsoever in excess of the amount and or percentage as may be provided for employees as set forth in the state operating appropriations act in effect at the time the compensation is payable.

             "(2) Increases in school district employee fringe benefit contributions by school districts shall be included for purposes of determining salary and compensation increases under this section if contributions to fringe benefits provided by a district exceed or, by virtue of the increase, will exceed the amount provided for fringe benefits in the state operating appropriations act in effect at the time the compensation is payable.

             "(3)For purposes of this section, salary and compensation shall not include the following:

             "(a) Payment for unused leave for illness or injury under RCW 28A.58.097,

             "(b) Employer contributions for the following employee fringe benefits:

             "(i) Old Age Survivors Insurance

             "(ii) Workers' Compensation

             "(iii) Unemployment Compensation

             "(iv) Retirement benefits under the Washington State Retirement System.

             "(4) Provisions of any contract in force on March 20, 1981 which conflict with requirements of this section shall continue in effect until contract expiration.  After expiration, any new contract executed between the parties shall be consistent with this section."  (Emphasis supplied.)

              [[Orig. Op. Page 3]]

            The qualification in our otherwise affirmative answer to your question1/ reflects the exceptions set forth in subsection (3) of this statute.  Otherwise, with the further exception, under subsection (4), of contracts already in force on March 20, 1981 ". . . which conflict with requirements of this section . . .,"2/ this 1981 legislative enactment contains a clear, unambiguous, express statutory prohibition against salary increases for school district employees from any source whatsoever which will exceed,

             ". . . the amount and or percentage as may be provided for employees as set forth in the state operating appropriations act in effect at the time the compensation is payable."  (Emphasis supplied)

             We must next look, as this directed, to the provisions of the appropriations act now in effect; i.e., at the time that "compensation is payable" during the current, 1982-83 school year.  We turn, therefore, to chapter 340, Laws of 1981 as amended‑-first by chapter 14, Laws of 1981, 2nd Ex. Sess. and then by chapter 50, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess.‑-to determine what, if any, salary increases are allowable for school district employees during that school year.  Two sections of chapter 50,supra, command our attention.  Those sections, which became effective April 20, 1982, are § § 72 and 74.

             The first of those two sections, § 72, appropriates $2,588,868,000 to the Superintendent of Public Instruction for distribution to school districts‑-subject, however, to a number of "conditions and limitations" specified therein.  Those conditions include the following which we set forth in the amendatory form in which they appear in chapter 50,supra:

             "(1) For purposes of this act and compliance with chapter 16, Laws of 1981, the superintendent of public instruction shall ensure that no district provides salary and compensation increases from any fund source whatsoever in excess of those amounts for insurance benefit increases and/or for those percentages for salary increasesas specified in this act and LEAP Document 4:  PROVIDED, That for the 1981-82 school year, if a  [[Orig. Op. Page 4]] school district is in violation of chapter 16, Laws of 1981, or chapter 340, Laws of 1981, as now or hereafter amended, the superintendent shall withhold the lesser of five percent or an amount equal to the level of violation when applied to the district's respective basic education allocation, until such time as the school district comes into compliance:  PROVIDED FURTHER, That for the 1982-83 school year, the superintendent shall withhold five percent of a district's respective basic education allocation if the school district violates any provision of this act or chapter 16, Laws of 1981 until such time as a school district comes into compliance:  PROVIDED FURTHER, That provisions of any contract in force as of the effective date of chapter 16, Laws of 1981, for school years 1981-82 and 1982-83 that conflict with the provisions of this act may continue in effect and no funds shall be withheld as a result of such contracts:  PROVIDED FURTHER, That provisions of a contract in compliance with chapter 16, Laws of 1981,and chapter 340, Laws of 1981, entered into prior ((to November  , 1981,)) to the effective date of this 1982 act, for the 1982-83 school year that conflicts with provisions of this ((1981))1982 amendatory act may continue in effectand no funds shall be withheld as a result of such contracts."

            Those stated conditions, it will be seen, first recognize the relationship that exists between the "compensation limitation" statute (RCW 28A.58.095,supra) and the appropriations act in effect when the compensation is payable;i.e., that the authority of a school district to grant increases in employee compensation is limited to such amounts and percentages as are specified in both the appropriations act and LEAP Document 4.3/   The conditions also state, in the fourth proviso, that contracts entered into prior to April 20, 1982 (the effective date of chapter 50, supra) which comply with both the "compensation limitation" statute‑-and the  [[Orig. Op. Page 5]] original version of the 1981-83 appropriations act (chapter 340, Laws of 1981)‑-may continue in effect even though such contracts may conflict with the amendatory provisions of chapter 50,supra.  It is this proviso which apparently gives rise to the distinction in your question between contracts entered into before April 20, 1982, and those entered into on or after that date.

             Section 72,supra, does not, however, itself contain anything that would be in conflict with contracts which comply with the 1981-83 appropriations act as initially enacted (chapter 340, supra) or which otherwise explains why the legislature thought it necessary to expressly sanction or preserve contracts entered into prior to April 20, 1982, its effective date.  We next turn, therefore, to the second of the two sections above cited, § 74.  That section of chapter 50,supra, appropriates the reduced sum4/ of $112,299,000 for school district salary and compensation increases during the 1981-83 biennium.  And this appropriation is likewise subject to specified "conditions and limitations" including the following‑-set forth in the amendatory form in which they appear in chapter 50:

             ". . .

            "(2) Salary and insurance benefit increase funds shall be allocated by the superintendent of public instruction as specified in this section and may be expended by school districts for any state funded activity.

             "(3) ((The 1982-83 salary and incremental fringe benefit increase allocation provided by this section shall be implemented on January 1, 1983, to each local school district on the basis of the RCW 28A.48.010 monthly schedule for the applicable months during the 1982-83 state fiscal year.

             "(4))) A maximum of $((83,742,000))54,666,000 for the 1981-83 biennium may be expended for provision of basic education state‑supported certificated staff salary increasesas provided in LEAP Document 2 and concomitant incremental fringe benefits.  Local school district percentage salary increases under this section, excluding incremental fringe benefits.  Local school district percentage increases provided under this section, excluding incremental fringe benefits and including any relevant  [[Orig. Op. Page 6]] increases as a result of the provisions of subsection (((8))) (7) (b) and (c) of this section, shall not exceed the percentages specified in LEAP Document ((2)) 4.

             "(((5)))(4) A maximum of $((18,910,000)) 12,113,000 for the 1981-83 biennium may be expended for provision of basic education state‑supported classified staff salary increasesas provided in LEAP Document 2 and concomitant incremental fringe benefits.  Local school district percentage increases provided under this section, excluding incremental fringe benefits and including any relevant increases as a result of the provisions of subsection (((18)(b))) (7)(b) of this section, shall not exceed the percentages specified in LEAP Document ((2)) 4.

             ". . .

             "(((8)))(7) For purposes of chapter 16, Laws of 1981, the following conditions and limitations shall apply:

             "(a) Districts may provide salary and insurance benefit increases for nonstate‑supported activities at rates not exceeding those specified by LEAP Document ((2))4 for state‑supported basic education certificated staff in each school year of the biennium for each district.

            ". . .

            "(((10) The salary increase for the 1982-83 fiscal year shall take effect January 1, 1983.))  (9) The 1982-83 salary increase shall be effective on June 30, 1983, and shall be allocated by the superintendent of public instruction as specified in LEAP Document 2.

            "(10) A maximum of $451,000 shall be distributed to those school districts which after May 19, 1981, and prior to December 1, 1981, incurred a contractual obligation to pay any employee or employee group a salary increase during the 1982-83 school year and such obligation cannot be revoked or otherwise avoided by unilateral action of such districts:  PROVIDED, That the total salary increase obligation is within the limits prescribed by LEAP Document 2:  PROVIDED FURTHER, that the portion of salary increase funds provided to each qualifying district shall be distributed in the same proportion to the total  [[Orig. Op. Page 7]] provided herein as its irrevocable salary increase obligation is in proportion to the total irrevocable salary increase obligation of all qualifying districts:  PROVIDED FURTHER, That the determination of revocability or avoidability of the obligation for purposes of receipt of the funds provided under this subsection shall be the sole and final determination of the state attorney general after reviewing the contract regardless of what may be determined by an arbitrator or court as to the school district's obligation to its employees.

             ". . ."

             Two points are immediately apparent upon reading these conditions to the § 74 salary increase appropriation.  First, the amount of money initially appropriate for salary increases during the 1981-83 biennium was reduced (actually for a second time) by chapter 50,supra.5/   And second, as provided in subsection (9) of § 74, supra, the distribution by the Superintendent of Public Instruction of such salary increase funds as remain available for the 1982-83 school year was delayed (again for a second time) until June 30, 1983.6

              It is not entirely clear from this last noted provision, however, whether the legislature also intended to prohibit salary increases for the 1982-83 school year‑-prior to June 30, 1983‑-which could be provided with local funds or, perhaps, with  [[Orig. Op. Page 8]] state appropriated basic education funds.  Instead, we can conceive of three possible alternative constructions which could be given to chapter 50,supra, when read together with the "compensation limitation" statute.  They are:

             (1) That the only salary increases which are allowable for the 1982-83 school year are those which may be paid with state funds specifically appropriated therefore (i.e., by § 74, supra);

             (2) That only those school districts which entered into contractual obligations prior to April 20, 1982, to pay salary increases for the 1982-83 school year may give effect to and pay salary increases prior to June 30, 1983; and,

             (3) That school districts may nevertheless grant salary increases for the 1982-83 school year prior to June 30, 1983, subject only to the condition that such increases remain within the limits provided for pursuant to LEAP Document 4.

             For the reasons indicated below, we reject both the first and third view and accept the second.

             The line of argument in support of the first approach is relatively straight forward.  In this respect, we first note, again, that the "compensation limitation" statute (RCW 28A.58.095) refers to, and depends upon, the appropriations act to provide the "amount and or percentage" of salary increases, if any, which school districts may lawfully grant.  If one then accepts the premise that the function of an appropriations act is essentially limited to specifying the sums appropriated and the object of their expenditure, it arguably follows that the legislature intended‑-through its enactment of the "compensation limitation" statute‑-to authorize school districts to grant salary increases only to the extent of the "amount and or percentages" actually funded by the legislature from time to time.  In turn, all school districts would therefore be limited in terms of granting salary increases for the 1982-83 school year to the relatively small amounts of funds to be distributed pursuant to subsections (9) and (10) of § 74, supra.

             We believe that we must reject this view, however, in light of the fundamental principle of statutory construction which instructs us to construe together such statutes as are inpari materia (i.e., those that relate to the same thing).  Champion v. Shoreline School District, 81 Wn.2d 672, 674, 504 P.2d 304 (1972).  And likewise, as explained by our Court in State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith, 78 Wn.2d  [[Orig. Op. Page 9]] 152, 470 P.2d 172 (1970) legislative intent is to be gleaned from the reading of an enactment as a whole:

             "The main purpose of statutory interpretation is first to ascertain and then to give effect to the legislative intention.  Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 827, 844, 400 P.2d 72 (1965).  In discharging this duty, the court first looks at the language of the statute.  Schneider v. Forcier, 67 Wn.2d 161, 406 P.2d 935 (1965).  If the language is clear and the meaning plain, the statute needs no construction and the courts will neither read into it things which are not there nor amend it by construction.  King County v. Seattle, 70 Wn.2d 988, 425 P.2d 887 (1967).  A statute should be read as a whole and legislative intent derived from it as a whole.  Krystad v. Lau, supra; Finley v. Finley, 43 Wn.2d 755, 264 P.2d 246 (1953).  Legislative intent cannot be ascertained from a single sentence or even a solitary isolated paragraph (Markham Adv. Co. v. State, 73 Wn.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968)), for the meaning of a particular part or section of a statute is to be taken in context with the parts or sections in which it is found.  Nationwide Papers, Inc. v. Northwest Egg Sales, Inc., 69 Wn.2d 72, 416 P.2d 687 (1966);Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 60 Wn.2d 105, 371 P.2d 1009 (1962)."  State ex rel. Tarver,supra, at pages 155-156.

             In order to accept the first of the proferred [preferred] constructions we would be compelled to ignore or render virtually meaningless the very "proviso" in § 72,supra, which gave rise to your request.  Specifically, once more, the fourth "proviso" of that amended section expressly states that contracts in compliance with the appropriations act as initially enacted (and thus with the 1982-83 salary increases originally provided for therein) which were entered into prior to April 20, 1982 may continue in effect.7/

              [[Orig. Op. Page 10]]

            Passing over, for now, alternative (2), supra, we turn, next, to the third possible approach.  This alternative construction of the statute in question is premised upon the notion that § § 72 and 74 set forth two separate and distinct formulas.  One of those formulas is for the enforcement of salary increase limitations by the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the other is for the allocation of funds appropriated for salary increases.  Under this approach, that portion of subsection (9) of § 74, supra, which states "[t]he 1982-83 salary increase shall be effective on June 30, 1983" would be considered as having application solely to the Superintendent's act of disbursing salary increase funds in accordance with LEAP Document 2.  In turn, emphasis would be placed upon (a) the prefatory language of subsection (1) of § 72,supra, preceding the "provisos," which states in essence that the Superintendent is to ensure compliance with the salary increase limitations "specified in this act and LEAP Document 4"; and (b) those portions of subsections (3), (4) and (7)(a) of § 74,supra, which, standing alone, can be read as allowing school districts to grant salary increases for each school year of the biennium up to the limits established by LEAP Document 4.8

              [[Orig. Op. Page 11]]

            The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that a school district could grant salary increases for the 1982-83 school year from any fund source whatsoever9/ so long as the increases fall within the limits established by LEAP Document 4 as indicated by the provisions quoted in footnote 8 when viewed alone.  Again, however, we must disagree.

             It is true, we believe, that § § 72 and 74 of chapter 50, supra, do establish different formulas for compliance enforcement and for the disbursement of appropriated funds by the Superintendent of Public Instruction.  For it seems apparent that LEAP Document 2 is the gauge for the distribution of funds and that LEAP Document 4, which was introduced for the first time by chapter 50,supra, is the gauge for salary increase limitation compliance enforcement purposes.  But we also believe that there is a ready explanation for this distinction.

             Following the enactment of the original 1981-83 appropriations act, a suit was filed in Thurston County Superior Court challenging the correctness of certain base salaries set forth in LEAP Document 2.10/   On September 28, 1982, the Court ruled against the plaintiff school district and held that it was the province of the legislature, not the courts, to amend the legislation and establish the higher base salary sought by the district.  Thereafter, the legislature revised LEAP Document 2 so as to correct the base  [[Orig. Op. Page 12]] salaries initially set forth therein in the case of the plaintiff and certain other school districts.  The revised document was adopted in the form of LEAP Document 4 pursuant to chapter 50,supra.11/   The net result, in those cases in which the recognized base salary of a school district was corrected and revised upward, was to allow the affected districts to grant a greater salary increase during the 1981-83 biennium without violating the "compensation limitation" statute.  Salary increase funds appropriated to the Superintendent of Public Instruction are to be distributed, however, at the lower rate provided for in the case of those districts in LEAP Document 2.

             In the final analysis, however, while the foregoing recognizes and explains the distinction between the salary compliance and salary increase fund distribution formulas, it neither compels nor persuades us to conclude that the salary increase percentages established by LEAP Document 4 are the exclusive restraints upon salary increases which the legislature intended to impose for the 1982-83 school year.  Instead, we believe that we must reject this third alternative construction of the subject statutes on the basis of the same principles of statutory construction we applied in rejecting the first.  Again, § § 72 and 74 of chapter 50,supra, must be construed together in order to ascertain legislative intent and not in a manner which construes particular sentences in isolation from the whole.

             Were we to accept the third alternative we would be forced to limit the application of the fourth "proviso" to subsection (1) of § 72 (regarding existing contracts) to compensation increase compliance enforcement by the Superintendent of Public Instruction.  Such a limited application of the "proviso," however, would render it nonsensical.12/   And even more importantly, it would ignore the  [[Orig. Op. Page 13]] apparent tie between the "proviso" and subsection (9) of § 74,supra, which says that the 1982-83 salary increases shall not take effect until June 30, 1983.  For we believe it to be no mere coincidence that the legislature twice amended the appropriations act to reduce the funding for salary increases in a manner which, in both cases, concurrently provided (a) that the effective date of 1982-83 salary increases was to be delayed to a specified date; and (b) that contracts already entered into as of the dates of the two amendatory actions of the legislature could continue in effect‑-even though in conflict with the amendatory acts.  See, § 74,supra, which reflects first a delay until January 1, 1983, in the salary increase date and then later, a delay until June 30, 1983; and, § 72,supra, which reflects first an exception in the case of conflicting contracts entered into prior to "November ___, 1981,";13/ and then (again later) the exception provided for in the chase of those contracts entered into as of the effective date of chapter 50,supra.

             From this it seems apparent to us that the legislature recognized and understood that the "compensation limitation" statute (RCW 28A.58.095) means that salary increases are, indeed, limited to the amounts or percentages provided for in the appropriations act "at this time compensation is payable."  And, therefore, it sought to preserve the 1982-83 salary increase provisions of pre‑existing contracts which would otherwise have had no force and effect due to the salary increase funding reduction and delay amendments to § 74,supra.

             Each provision of § § 72 and 74 is given a meaningful effect when the two sections are construed together in the foregoing manner, including subsections (4), (5) and (7) of § 74, supra.  These subsections retain the force and effect of recognizing that school districts may grant salary increases for the 1981-82 and 1982-83 school years, but only to the extent not otherwise  [[Orig. Op. Page 14]] qualified by the appropriations act as we have indicated.

            This, then, leaves us with the second alternative construction of the statute above noted;i.e., once again, that only those school districts which entered into contractual obligations prior to April 20, 1982, to pay salary increases for the 1982-83 school year may give effect to and pay salary increases prior to June 30, 1983.  We have, in essence, supported our acceptance of that alternative construction in the course of rejecting the first and third and we will not belabor the matter further.  We adopt it, basically, by process of elimination.  Our conclusion, therefore, in direct response to your question is that due to the 1981-82 appropriations act‑-as last reflected in chapter 50, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess.‑-school districts are not legally permitted to grant salary increases (other than as permitted by RCW 28A.58.095(3), supra) for the 1982-83 school year prior to June 30, 1983, except in the case of those employees who are covered by contracts entered into prior to April 20, 1982, (and of course those entered into prior to March 20, 1981) which entitle the subject employees to salary increases during the 1982-83 year prior to June 30, 1983.14

              [[Orig. Op. Page 15]]

            We trust that the foregoing will be of assistance to you.

 Very truly yours,
KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY
Attorney General 

ROBERT E. PATTERSON
Assistant Attorney General

                                                         ***   FOOTNOTES   ***

 1/I.e., that the subject salary increasesare prohibited.

 2/But see the below noted final proviso to § 72, chapter 50, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess.

 3/LEAP Document 4 and its predecessor, LEAP Document 2, are incorporated into the appropriations act by virtue of the definitions set forth at § 73 of chapter 50 and the express references to those documents contained in the appropriations act.  A copy of the first page of each document, which specified salary increase percentages and the salary bases to which the percentages may be applied, is attached hereto for illustrative purposes.

 4/I.e., reduced from the original amount set forth in chapter 340, supra.

 5/Section 76 of chapter 14, Laws of 1981, 2nd Ex. Sess. earlier reduced the $182,988,000 initially appropriated for the biennium to $152,352,000.  We also understand that the total reduction in the amount of funds initially appropriated for salary increases is roughly equivalent to the amount necessary to fund the salary increases initially recognized pursuant to LEAP Document 2 for the period September 1, 1982, to June 30, 1983.

 6/Concurrent with the first reduction in salary increase funding, the legislature provided, in subsection (3) of § 76, chapter 14, Laws of 1981, 2nd Ex. Sess. that "[t]he 1982-83 salary and incremental fringe benefit increase allocation provided by this section shall be implemented on January 1, 1983, . . ."  That subsection has, however, now been repealed and replaced by subsection (9) of § 74, chapter 50,supra, which extends the date to June 30, 1983.

 7/We also recognize that negative constitutional overtones are implicit in the first alternative construction in light of Article II, § 19 of our state constitution which provides that "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."  SeeFlanders v. Morris, 88 Wn.2d 183, 558 P.2d 769 (1977) in which our Court found fatal fault with a substantive provision of an appropriations act which went beyond limiting disbursements or qualifying the appropriations.  But see,Washington Education Association v. State, 93 Wn.2d 37, 604 P.2d 950 (1980) in which the Court expressly suggested that the 1979-81 Biennial Appropriations Act could have served as the vehicle for amending the substantive statutory power of school districts to fix employee salary levels.  It is, however, a longstanding policy of our office to presume the constitutionality of enacted legislation.  Accordingly, we decline to take a position on this issue unless, of course, it becomes necessary to do so in connection with litigation which challenges the salary increase provisions of chapter 50, supra.

 8/For ease of reference the pertinent portions of those subsections are repeated as follows:

             "(3) . . . Local school district percentage salary increases under this section, excluding incremental fringe benefits and including any relevant increases as a result of the provisions of subsection (7)(b) and (c) of this section, shall not exceed the percentages specified in LEAP Document 4.

             "(4) . . . Local School district percentage increases provided under this section, excluding incremental fringe benefits and including any relevant increases as a result of the provisions of subsection (7)(b) of this section, shall not exceed the percentages specified in LEAP Document 4.

             ". . .

             "(7)  For Purposes of chapter 16, Laws of 1981, the following conditions and limitations shall apply:

             "(a)  Districts may provide salary and insurance benefit increases for nonstate‑supported activities at rates not exceeding those specified by LEAP Document 4 for state‑supported basic education certificated staff in each school year of the biennium for each district."

 9/With the exception of special levy revenues to the extent RCW 84.52.0531 prohibits the use of such revenues to directly or indirectly increase the average salary of certain school district personnel.

 10/Lake Washington School District No. 414 v. State of Washington, et al., Thurston County Superior Court case number 81-2-8701-1.

 11/See § 73 of chapter 50, Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess.

 12/If all school districts were deemed to be able to grant 1982-83 salary increases so long as the increases are within the limits established by LEAP Document 4, as suggested by the third alternative construction, there would have been no need for the legislature to enact an exception with respect to conflicting contracts unless the "proviso" is to be construed as excusing such contracts from LEAP Document 4 limitations.  But that cannot be so since the terms of the "proviso" limit its application to contracts which comply with the appropriations act as initially enacted (chapter 340, Laws of 1981); and thus, with LEAP Document 2 which establishes salary increase limitations which are equal to or within those established by LEAP Document 4.

 13/The effective date of the first amendatory act, chapter 14, Laws of 1981, 2nd Ex. Sess., was actually December 1, 1981.  It appears as though the specific November, 1981, date was left blank in anticipation of both adjournment and an effective date within the month of November, but for one reason or another the legislature did not change or complete its designation of a November date.

 14/All other school district employees who have compensation due and payable as of June 30, 1983, may be eligible for salary increase during the 1982-83 school year, but not before that date.

             But we should also point out that the manner in which the allowable salary increase is to be computed in their case is not apparent.  There are, however, constitutional limitations to be noted with respect to providing a salary increase for services rendered prior to June 30, 1983.  We have reference to Article II, § 25 and Article VIII, § 7 of the state constitution, both of which would limit salary increases becoming effective on June 30, 1983, to payment for services rendered on or after that date‑-except in the case of those employees who, by virtue of a collective bargaining contract, for example, have a contractually based expectation of a salary increase for services rendered prior to June 30, 1983, at the time the services are performed.  Cf.,Christie v. The Port of Olympia, 27 Wn.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947) and AGO 1974 No. 19.