INTERPRETATION OF RCW 49.48.010 AND 49.48.020, REQUIRING PAYMENT OF WAGES TO BE MADE IN LAWFUL MONEY OR NEGOTIABLE ORDER 'FORTHWITH' UPON THE DISCHARGE OR VOLUNTARY QUIT OF ANY LABORER AND...

INTERPRETATION OF RCW 49.48.010 AND 49.48.020, REQUIRING PAYMENT OF WAGES TO BE MADE IN LAWFUL MONEY OR NEGOTIABLE ORDER "FORTHWITH" UPON THE DISCHARGE OR VOLUNTARY QUIT OF ANY LABORER AND PROVIDING A PENALTY FOR NONCOMPLIANCE

When any laborer performing work or labor shall cease to work whether by discharge or by voluntary withdrawal, the wages due shall be forthwith paid either in cash or by order redeemable in cash at its face value, and any violation thereof shall constitute a misdemeanor.

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                                                                   June 26, 1952

Honorable Gordon J. Brown
Representative Twenty-Ninth District
237 Farallone Avenue, Fircrest
Tacoma, Washington                                                                                                              Cite as:  AGO 51-53 No. 334

Dear Sir:

            Your letter of June 5, 1952, requests our interpretation of RCW 49.48.010 and 49.48.020, together with a definition of the word "forthwith."

            Our conclusion may be summarized as follows:

            Under the provisions of RCW 49.48.010 any laborer or workman who ceases work, whether by voluntary quit or discharge is entitled to have his wages paid immediately either in cash or by order redeemable in cash at its face value and any violation of this section shall, under the provisions of RCW 49.48.020 constitute a misdemeanor: Provided, That if a plan for the weekly payment of wages has been established in accordance with subsection (2) of paragraph 1 of RCW 49.48.010, then the provisions of paragraph 2 of subsection (1) shall not apply.

                                                                     ANALYSIS

            RCW 49.48.010 provides as follows:

             [[Orig. Op. Page 2]]

            "(1) It shall not be lawful for any person, firm, or corporation, engaged in manufacturing, mining, railroading, constructing railroads, or any business or enterprise of whatsoever kind, to issue, pay out, or circulate for payment of wages, any order, check, memorandum, token, or evidence of indebtedness, payable in whole or in part otherwise than in lawful money of the United States, unless the same is negotiable and redeemable at its face value, without discount, in cash or on demand, at the store or other place of business of such person, firm, or corporation when issued, and the person who, or firm or company which, issues any such order, check, memorandum, token, or other evidence of indebtedness, shall upon presentation and demand redeem it in lawful money of the United States.

            "When any laborer performing work or labor ceases to work, whether by discharge or by voluntary withdrawal, the wages due must be paid forthwith either in cash or by order redeemable in cash at its face value on presentment at a bank, store, commissary, or other place in the county where the labor was performed:  Provided, That such order may be made payable at a place in another county if more convenient of access to the employee.

            "(2) The last paragraph of subsection (1) shall not apply when workers are engaged in an employment that normally involves working for several employers in the same industry interchangeably, and the several employers or some of them cooperate to establish a plan for the weekly payment of wages at a central place or places and in accordance with a unified schedule of paydays providing for at least one payday each week; but this subsection shall not apply to any such plan until ten days after notice of their intention to set up such a plan shall have been given to the director of labor and industries by the employers who cooperate to establish the plan; and having once been established, no such plan can be abandoned except after notice of their intention to  [[Orig. Op. Page 3]] abandon such plan has been given to the director of labor and industries by the employers intending to abandon the plan.  (1947 c 181 § 1, last am'ds 1888 p 234 § 1, Rem. Supp. 1947, § 7594)" (Emphasis supplied)

            RCW 49.48.020, provides as follows:

            "Any person, or any officer or agent of a firm or a corporation, engaged in a business or enterprise mentioned in RCW 49.48.010, who issues or circulates in payment for wages any order, check, memorandum, token, or evidence of indebtedness, payable in whole or in part otherwise than in lawful money and without being payable as required by RCW 49.48.010; or who fails to redeem the same when presented, in lawful money of the United States; or who compels or attempts to coerce any employee to purchase meals, lodging, goods, wares, merchandise, or supplies from any particular person, firm, or corporation shall, on conviction, be fined in any sum not exceeding three hundred dollars, or upon failure to pay the fine and costs, be committed to the county jail until they are discharged as provided by law.  (1933 ex. s. c 20 § 1; 1888 p. 234 § 2; RRS § 7595.)"

            The word "forthwith" as defined by Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, means immediately; without delay; hence, within a reasonable time; promptly and with reasonable dispatch.

            Our Supreme Court has had occasion to pass upon the first paragraph of RCW 49.48.010, which was originally passed in 1888, amended by section 1, chapter 112, p. 219, Laws of 1905, as amended by section 1, chapter 181, p. 814, Laws of 1947, Rem. Supp. 1947 § 7594.

            InShortall v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Co., 45 Wash. 290, the court in effect held that an act providing that the wages of labor shall be forthwith paid on cessation of the work is in accordance with sound public policy, and is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, and renders the same at once due, notwithstanding a written contract postponing the date of payment upon the employees voluntarily leaving the service.

             [[Orig. Op. Page 4]]

            InBurdette v. Broadview Dairy Co., 123 Wash. 158, the court quotes from Rem. Comp. Stat., § 7594, as follows:

            "* * *'And when any laborer performing work or labor as above shall cease to work whether by discharge or by voluntary withdrawal the wages due shall be forthwith paid either in cash or by order redeemable in cash at its face value.'  * * *"

            The court then went on to say on page 162:

            "* * * This statute has been considered or referred to inShortall v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 45 Wash. 290, 88 Pac. 212, 122 Am. St. 899;State v. Chehalis Furniture & Mfg. Co., 47 Wash. 378, 92 Pac. 277; and inHatcher v. Idaho Gold & Ruby Mining Co., 106 Wash. 108, 179 Pac. 106, and it would seem that its meaning is no longer in doubt.  In theShortall case, a contract similar in its terms to those involved here was considered, and though that contract by its terms deferred the date of payment, should the employee voluntarily quit his employment, still the statute was held to be well within the rules of sound public policy, and to apply notwithstanding the contract."

            Again on page 163, it is said:

            "It is clear that the statute establishes a rule of public policy, and that the natural right of the employer and the employee to contract between themselves must yield to what the legislature has established as the law.  To hold otherwise would put it within the power of every corporation employing labor, by exacting a contract before employing, to set at naught the plain provisions of the statute."

            InPillatos v. Hyde, 11 Wn. (2d) 403, the court at page 407, said:

            "The statute plainly prohibits any person or corporation, engaged in any business or enterprise of whatsoever kind within this state from paying  [[Orig. Op. Page 5]] to any laborer who shall cease to work for such person or corporation the wages due in anything other than lawful money of the United States, or by an order or check payable in lawful money of the United States in the county where the labor was performed.

            "The contract in the case at bar comes within the ban of Rem. Rev. Stat. § 7594, which declares a rule of public policy in this state designed to protect wage earners who are employed in certain industries; and where an employer and his or its employee attempt to make a contract of employment in violation of the clearly expressed provision of the statute, the natural right of the employer and the employee to contract between themselves must, as stated in Burdette v. Broadview Dairy Co., 123 Wash. 158, 212 Pac. 181, yield to what the legislature has established as the law.  The statute is mandatory that wages be paidforthwith, on ceasing work, in lawful money of the United States or by order or check redeemable in cash at its face value in the county where the labor was performed."  (Emphasis supplied)

            The foregoing citation of cases is the Supreme Court's interpretation of paragraph (1) of RCW 49.48.010.

            Our interpretation of paragraph (2) is that, where an individual is employed by several employers working interchangeably, the several employers must establish a plan for the weekly payment of wages at a central place providing for at least one payday each week, which plan would be inoperative until ten days notice had been given to the director of the department of labor and industries.

            Under such an arrangement it would be possible for one or more employees to have completed their work with one or more employers or to have voluntarily quit, short of a week, in which event, the provisions set forth in paragraph (1) would not apply.  This for the reason that the plan would have established a regular weekly payday.

             [[Orig. Op. Page 6]]

            RCW 49.48.020, is a penal statute and is applicable whenever there is a violation of paragraph (1) of RCW 49.48.010.  We have not been able to find any case where our Supreme Court has passed upon this statute.  Possibly the most obvious reason for this is because it has been the policy of the Attorney General as legal adviser of the department of labor and industries to pursue the civil remedy provided in RCW 49.48.040.

            InEx Parte Oswald, 244 Pac. 940 (Cal.), a statute providing for imprisonment of employer who wilfully and with wrongful intent refuses payment when able, was not unconstitutional.

            InEx Parte Trombley, 193 P. (2d) 734 (Cal.), it was held that the provisions of a statute similar to the one under consideration were adopted to protect the poor but honest debtor who is unable to pay his debts, and were not intended to shield a dishonest man who takes an unconscionable advantage of another and such provisions did not violate the Constitution Article I, § 15, against imprisonment for debt.

            The interpretation which we have placed upon the foregoing statutes is supported by decisions from this and other jurisdictions and follows the majority rule.

Very truly yours,

SMITH TROY
Attorney General

BERNARD A. JOHNSON
Assistant Attorney General